Poisoned LangChain: Jailbreak LLMs by LangChain

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.18122v1
• Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2024 07:21:02 GMT
• Title: Poisoned LangChain: Jailbreak LLMs by LangChain
• Authors: Ziqiu Wang, Jun Liu, Shengkai Zhang, Yang Yang,
• Abstract summary: We propose the concept of indirect jailbreak and achieve Retrieval-Augmented Generation via LangChain. We tested this method on six different large language models across three major categories of jailbreak issues.
• Score: 9.658883589561915
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: With the development of natural language processing (NLP), large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly popular. LLMs are integrating more into everyday life, raising public concerns about their security vulnerabilities. Consequently, the security of large language models is becoming critically important. Currently, the techniques for attacking and defending against LLMs are continuously evolving. One significant method type of attack is the jailbreak attack, which designed to evade model safety mechanisms and induce the generation of inappropriate content. Existing jailbreak attacks primarily rely on crafting inducement prompts for direct jailbreaks, which are less effective against large models with robust filtering and high comprehension abilities. Given the increasing demand for real-time capabilities in large language models, real-time updates and iterations of new knowledge have become essential. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), an advanced technique to compensate for the model's lack of new knowledge, is gradually becoming mainstream. As RAG enables the model to utilize external knowledge bases, it provides a new avenue for jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we conduct the first work to propose the concept of indirect jailbreak and achieve Retrieval-Augmented Generation via LangChain. Building on this, we further design a novel method of indirect jailbreak attack, termed Poisoned-LangChain (PLC), which leverages a poisoned external knowledge base to interact with large language models, thereby causing the large models to generate malicious non-compliant dialogues.We tested this method on six different large language models across three major categories of jailbreak issues. The experiments demonstrate that PLC successfully implemented indirect jailbreak attacks under three different scenarios, achieving success rates of 88.56%, 79.04%, and 82.69% respectively.

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