Coordinated Disclosure of Dual-Use Capabilities: An Early Warning System for Advanced AI

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.01420v3
• Date: Fri, 04 Oct 2024 19:06:02 GMT
• Title: Coordinated Disclosure of Dual-Use Capabilities: An Early Warning System for Advanced AI
• Authors: Joe O'Brien, Shaun Ee, Jam Kraprayoon, Bill Anderson-Samways, Oscar Delaney, Zoe Williams,
• Abstract summary: We propose Coordinated Disclosure of Dual-Use Capabilities (CDDC) as a process to guide early information-sharing between advanced AI developers, U.S. government agencies, and other private sector actors. This aims to provide the U.S. government, dual-use foundation model developers, and other actors with an overview of AI capabilities that could significantly impact public safety and security, as well as maximal time to respond.
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• Abstract: Advanced AI systems may be developed which exhibit capabilities that present significant risks to public safety or security. They may also exhibit capabilities that may be applied defensively in a wide set of domains, including (but not limited to) developing societal resilience against AI threats. We propose Coordinated Disclosure of Dual-Use Capabilities (CDDC) as a process to guide early information-sharing between advanced AI developers, US government agencies, and other private sector actors about these capabilities. The process centers around an information clearinghouse (the "coordinator") which receives evidence of dual-use capabilities from finders via mandatory and/or voluntary reporting pathways, and passes noteworthy reports to defenders for follow-up (i.e., further analysis and response). This aims to provide the US government, dual-use foundation model developers, and other actors with an overview of AI capabilities that could significantly impact public safety and security, as well as maximal time to respond.

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