Physical Security of Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution Devices

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.16835v1
• Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2024 18:01:04 GMT
• Title: Physical Security of Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution Devices
• Authors: Friederike Jöhlinger, Henry Semenenko, Philip Sibson, Djeylan Aktas, John Rarity, Chris Erven, Siddarth Joshi, Imad Faruque,
• Abstract summary: This paper explores the Trojan horse attack (THA) using Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD integrated photonic chips. We show that a monitor photodiode paired appropriately with enough optical isolation, given the sensitivity of the photodiode, can detect high power sniffing attacks.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models assumed in the security proof is imperative. In this paper, we explore the Trojan horse attack (THA) using Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD integrated photonic chips and how to avoid some of the security vulnerabilities using only on-chip components. We show that a monitor photodiode paired appropriately with enough optical isolation, given the sensitivity of the photodiode, can detect high power sniffing attacks. We also show that the placement of amplitude modulators with respect to back reflecting components and their switching time can be used to thwart a THA.

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