MERGE: Matching Electronic Results with Genuine Evidence for verifiable voting in person at remote locations

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.06705v2
• Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 08:07:26 GMT
• Title: MERGE: Matching Electronic Results with Genuine Evidence for verifiable voting in person at remote locations
• Authors: Ben Adida, John Caron, Arash Mirzaei, Vanessa Teague,
• Abstract summary: We introduce the MERGE protocol to combine the speed of electronic ballot delivery with the reliability of paper returns. This protocol allows voters to submit an electronic record of their vote quickly while simultaneously mailing a paper ballot for verification. The electronic record can be used for preliminary results, but the paper ballot is used in a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) if received in time, ensuring the integrity of the election.
• Score: 2.206168301581203
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Overseas military personnel often face significant challenges in participating in elections due to the slow pace of traditional mail systems, which can result in ballots missing crucial deadlines. While internet-based voting offers a faster alternative, it introduces serious risks to the integrity and privacy of the voting process. We introduce the MERGE protocol to address these issues by combining the speed of electronic ballot delivery with the reliability of paper returns. This protocol allows voters to submit an electronic record of their vote quickly while simultaneously mailing a paper ballot for verification. The electronic record can be used for preliminary results, but the paper ballot is used in a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) if received in time, ensuring the integrity of the election. This approach extends the time window for ballot arrival without undermining the security and accuracy of the vote count.

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