CausalDiff: Causality-Inspired Disentanglement via Diffusion Model for Adversarial Defense

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23091v1
• Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2024 15:06:44 GMT
• Title: CausalDiff: Causality-Inspired Disentanglement via Diffusion Model for Adversarial Defense
• Authors: Mingkun Zhang, Keping Bi, Wei Chen, Quanrun Chen, Jiafeng Guo, Xueqi Cheng,
• Abstract summary: Humans are difficult to be cheated by subtle manipulations, since we make judgments only based on essential factors. Inspired by this observation, we attempt to model label generation with essential label-causative factors and incorporate label-non-causative factors to assist data generation. For an adversarial example, we aim to discriminate perturbations as non-causative factors and make predictions only based on the label-causative factors.
• Score: 61.78357530675446
• License:
• Abstract: Despite ongoing efforts to defend neural classifiers from adversarial attacks, they remain vulnerable, especially to unseen attacks. In contrast, humans are difficult to be cheated by subtle manipulations, since we make judgments only based on essential factors. Inspired by this observation, we attempt to model label generation with essential label-causative factors and incorporate label-non-causative factors to assist data generation. For an adversarial example, we aim to discriminate the perturbations as non-causative factors and make predictions only based on the label-causative factors. Concretely, we propose a casual diffusion model (CausalDiff) that adapts diffusion models for conditional data generation and disentangles the two types of casual factors by learning towards a novel casual information bottleneck objective. Empirically, CausalDiff has significantly outperformed state-of-the-art defense methods on various unseen attacks, achieving an average robustness of 86.39% (+4.01%) on CIFAR-10, 56.25% (+3.13%) on CIFAR-100, and 82.62% (+4.93%) on GTSRB (German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark).

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