Immune: Improving Safety Against Jailbreaks in Multi-modal LLMs via Inference-Time Alignment

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.18688v2
• Date: Fri, 20 Dec 2024 18:48:27 GMT
• Title: Immune: Improving Safety Against Jailbreaks in Multi-modal LLMs via Inference-Time Alignment
• Authors: Soumya Suvra Ghosal, Souradip Chakraborty, Vaibhav Singh, Tianrui Guan, Mengdi Wang, Ahmad Beirami, Furong Huang, Alvaro Velasquez, Dinesh Manocha, Amrit Singh Bedi,
• Abstract summary: Despite training-time safety alignment, MLLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. We propose Immune, an inference-time defense framework that leverages a safe reward model to defend against jailbreak attacks.
• Score: 97.38766396447369
• License:
• Abstract: With the widespread deployment of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) for visual-reasoning tasks, improving their safety has become crucial. Recent research indicates that despite training-time safety alignment, these models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. In this work, we first highlight an important safety gap to describe that alignment achieved solely through safety training may be insufficient against jailbreak attacks. To address this vulnerability, we propose Immune, an inference-time defense framework that leverages a safe reward model through controlled decoding to defend against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we provide a mathematical characterization of Immune, offering provable guarantees against jailbreaks. Extensive evaluations on diverse jailbreak benchmarks using recent MLLMs reveal that Immune effectively enhances model safety while preserving the model's original capabilities. For instance, against text-based jailbreak attacks on LLaVA-1.6, Immune reduces the attack success rate by 57.82% and 16.78% compared to the base MLLM and state-of-the-art defense strategy, respectively.

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