BadSAD: Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks against Deep Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.13324v1
- Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 20:52:56 GMT
- Title: BadSAD: Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks against Deep Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection
- Authors: He Cheng, Depeng Xu, Shuhan Yuan,
- Abstract summary: BadSAD is a novel backdoor attack framework designed to target DeepSAD models.
Our approach involves two key phases: trigger injection, and latent space manipulation.
Experiments on benchmark datasets validate the effectiveness of our attack strategy.
- Score: 9.13918865694443
- License:
- Abstract: Image anomaly detection (IAD) is essential in applications such as industrial inspection, medical imaging, and security. Despite the progress achieved with deep learning models like Deep Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection (DeepSAD), these models remain susceptible to backdoor attacks, presenting significant security challenges. In this paper, we introduce BadSAD, a novel backdoor attack framework specifically designed to target DeepSAD models. Our approach involves two key phases: trigger injection, where subtle triggers are embedded into normal images, and latent space manipulation, which positions and clusters the poisoned images near normal images to make the triggers appear benign. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets validate the effectiveness of our attack strategy, highlighting the severe risks that backdoor attacks pose to deep learning-based anomaly detection systems.
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