Practical and Ready-to-Use Methodology to Assess the re-identification Risk in Anonymized Datasets

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.10841v1
• Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2025 18:22:27 GMT
• Title: Practical and Ready-to-Use Methodology to Assess the re-identification Risk in Anonymized Datasets
• Authors: Louis-Philippe Sondeck, Maryline Laurent,
• Abstract summary: This paper proposes a practical and ready-to-use methodology for re-identification risk assessment. It is the first to follow well-known risk analysis methods (e.g. EBIOS) that have been used in the cybersecurity field for years.
• Score: 1.4732811715354455
• License:
• Abstract: To prove that a dataset is sufficiently anonymized, many privacy policies suggest that a re-identification risk assessment be performed, but do not provide a precise methodology for doing so, leaving the industry alone with the problem. This paper proposes a practical and ready-to-use methodology for re-identification risk assessment, the originality of which is manifold: (1) it is the first to follow well-known risk analysis methods (e.g. EBIOS) that have been used in the cybersecurity field for years, which consider not only the ability to perform an attack, but also the impact such an attack can have on an individual; (2) it is the first to qualify attributes and values of attributes with e.g. degree of exposure, as known real-world attacks mainly target certain types of attributes and not others.

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