Learning to Bid in Non-Stationary Repeated First-Price Auctions

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.13358v1
• Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 03:53:27 GMT
• Title: Learning to Bid in Non-Stationary Repeated First-Price Auctions
• Authors: Zihao Hu, Xiaoyu Fan, Yuan Yao, Jiheng Zhang, Zhengyuan Zhou,
• Abstract summary: First-price auctions have gained significant traction in digital advertising markets. determining an optimal bidding strategy in first-price auctions is more complex. We introduce two metrics to quantify the regularity of the bidding sequence.
• Score: 20.933903777434086
• License:
• Abstract: First-price auctions have recently gained significant traction in digital advertising markets, exemplified by Google's transition from second-price to first-price auctions. Unlike in second-price auctions, where bidding one's private valuation is a dominant strategy, determining an optimal bidding strategy in first-price auctions is more complex. From a learning perspective, the learner (a specific bidder) can interact with the environment (other bidders) sequentially to infer their behaviors. Existing research often assumes specific environmental conditions and benchmarks performance against the best fixed policy (static benchmark). While this approach ensures strong learning guarantees, the static benchmark can deviate significantly from the optimal strategy in environments with even mild non-stationarity. To address such scenarios, a dynamic benchmark, which represents the sum of the best possible rewards at each time step, offers a more suitable objective. However, achieving no-regret learning with respect to the dynamic benchmark requires additional constraints. By inspecting reward functions in online first-price auctions, we introduce two metrics to quantify the regularity of the bidding sequence, which serve as measures of non-stationarity. We provide a minimax-optimal characterization of the dynamic regret when either of these metrics is sub-linear in the time horizon.

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