Picky LLMs and Unreliable RMs: An Empirical Study on Safety Alignment after Instruction Tuning

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.01116v1
• Date: Mon, 03 Feb 2025 07:09:09 GMT
• Title: Picky LLMs and Unreliable RMs: An Empirical Study on Safety Alignment after Instruction Tuning
• Authors: Guanlin Li, Kangjie Chen, Shangwei Guo, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu, Chao Zhang, Guoyin Wang, Tianwei Zhang, Jiwei Li,
• Abstract summary: Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) can inadvertently degrade their safety alignment. This phenomenon makes models more susceptible to providing inappropriate responses. Our work highlights the complexities of maintaining safety alignment during fine-tuning.
• Score: 39.48925539103229
• License:
• Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for addressing a wide range of general inquiries and tasks. Despite this, fine-tuning aligned LLMs on smaller, domain-specific datasets, critical to adapting them to specialized tasks, can inadvertently degrade their safety alignment, even when the datasets are benign. This phenomenon makes models more susceptible to providing inappropriate responses. In this study, we systematically examine the factors contributing to safety alignment degradation in benign fine-tuning scenarios. Our analysis identifies three critical factors affecting aligned LLMs: answer structure, identity calibration, and role-play. Additionally, we evaluate the reliability of state-of-the-art reward models (RMs), which are often used to guide alignment processes. Our findings reveal that these RMs frequently fail to accurately reflect human preferences regarding safety, underscoring their limitations in practical applications. By uncovering these challenges, our work highlights the complexities of maintaining safety alignment during fine-tuning and offers guidance to help developers balance utility and safety in LLMs. Datasets and fine-tuning code used in our experiments can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/llm_instruction_tuning.

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