Trust Under Siege: Label Spoofing Attacks against Machine Learning for Android Malware Detection

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11841v1
• Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 20:05:56 GMT
• Title: Trust Under Siege: Label Spoofing Attacks against Machine Learning for Android Malware Detection
• Authors: Tianwei Lan, Luca Demetrio, Farid Nait-Abdesselam, Yufei Han, Simone Aonzo,
• Abstract summary: We introduce label spoofing attacks, a new threat that contaminates crowd-sourced datasets by embedding minimal and undetectable malicious patterns.<n>We demonstrate this scenario by developing AndroVenom, a methodology for polluting realistic data sources.<n> Experiments show that not only state-of-the-art feature extractors are unable to filter such injection, but also various ML models experience Denial of Service.
• Score: 11.53708766953391
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Machine learning (ML) malware detectors rely heavily on crowd-sourced AntiVirus (AV) labels, with platforms like VirusTotal serving as a trusted source of malware annotations. But what if attackers could manipulate these labels to classify benign software as malicious? We introduce label spoofing attacks, a new threat that contaminates crowd-sourced datasets by embedding minimal and undetectable malicious patterns into benign samples. These patterns coerce AV engines into misclassifying legitimate files as harmful, enabling poisoning attacks against ML-based malware classifiers trained on those data. We demonstrate this scenario by developing AndroVenom, a methodology for polluting realistic data sources, causing consequent poisoning attacks against ML malware detectors. Experiments show that not only state-of-the-art feature extractors are unable to filter such injection, but also various ML models experience Denial of Service already with 1% poisoned samples. Additionally, attackers can flip decisions of specific unaltered benign samples by modifying only 0.015% of the training data, threatening their reputation and market share and being unable to be stopped by anomaly detectors on training data. We conclude our manuscript by raising the alarm on the trustworthiness of the training process based on AV annotations, requiring further investigation on how to produce proper labels for ML malware detectors.

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