Exploring Backdoor Attack and Defense for LLM-empowered Recommendations

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2504.11182v1
• Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 13:37:38 GMT
• Title: Exploring Backdoor Attack and Defense for LLM-empowered Recommendations
• Authors: Liangbo Ning, Wenqi Fan, Qing Li,
• Abstract summary: We propose a new attack framework termed Backdoor Injection Poisoning for RecSys (BadRec)<n>BadRec perturbs the items' titles with triggers and employs several fake users to interact with these items, effectively poisoning the training set and injecting backdoors into RecSys.<n>We propose a universal defense strategy called Poison Scanner (P-Scanner) to mitigate such a security threat.
• Score: 15.098844020816552
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The fusion of Large Language Models (LLMs) with recommender systems (RecSys) has dramatically advanced personalized recommendations and drawn extensive attention. Despite the impressive progress, the safety of LLM-based RecSys against backdoor attacks remains largely under-explored. In this paper, we raise a new problem: Can a backdoor with a specific trigger be injected into LLM-based Recsys, leading to the manipulation of the recommendation responses when the backdoor trigger is appended to an item's title? To investigate the vulnerabilities of LLM-based RecSys under backdoor attacks, we propose a new attack framework termed Backdoor Injection Poisoning for RecSys (BadRec). BadRec perturbs the items' titles with triggers and employs several fake users to interact with these items, effectively poisoning the training set and injecting backdoors into LLM-based RecSys. Comprehensive experiments reveal that poisoning just 1% of the training data with adversarial examples is sufficient to successfully implant backdoors, enabling manipulation of recommendations. To further mitigate such a security threat, we propose a universal defense strategy called Poison Scanner (P-Scanner). Specifically, we introduce an LLM-based poison scanner to detect the poisoned items by leveraging the powerful language understanding and rich knowledge of LLMs. A trigger augmentation agent is employed to generate diverse synthetic triggers to guide the poison scanner in learning domain-specific knowledge of the poisoned item detection task. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets validate the effectiveness of the proposed P-Scanner.

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