Spill The Beans: Exploiting CPU Cache Side-Channels to Leak Tokens from Large Language Models

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.00817v1
• Date: Thu, 01 May 2025 19:18:56 GMT
• Title: Spill The Beans: Exploiting CPU Cache Side-Channels to Leak Tokens from Large Language Models
• Authors: Andrew Adiletta, Berk Sunar,
• Abstract summary: We introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to leak tokens generated by Large Language Models (LLMs)<n>A significant challenge is the massive size of LLMs, which, by nature of their compute intensive operation, quickly evicts embedding vectors from the cache.<n>Monitoring more tokens increases potential vocabulary leakage but raises the chance of missing cache hits due to eviction.<n>Our findings reveal a new vulnerability in LLM deployments, highlighting that even sophisticated models are susceptible to traditional side-channel attacks.
• Score: 4.5987419425784966
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to leak tokens generated by an LLM. By co-locating an attack process on the same hardware as the victim model, we flush and reload embedding vectors from the embedding layer, where each token corresponds to a unique embedding vector. When accessed during token generation, it results in a cache hit detectable by our attack on shared lower-level caches. A significant challenge is the massive size of LLMs, which, by nature of their compute intensive operation, quickly evicts embedding vectors from the cache. We address this by balancing the number of tokens monitored against the amount of information leaked. Monitoring more tokens increases potential vocabulary leakage but raises the chance of missing cache hits due to eviction; monitoring fewer tokens improves detection reliability but limits vocabulary coverage. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate the feasibility of leaking tokens from LLMs via cache side-channels. Our findings reveal a new vulnerability in LLM deployments, highlighting that even sophisticated models are susceptible to traditional side-channel attacks. We discuss the implications for privacy and security in LLM-serving infrastructures and suggest considerations for mitigating such threats. For proof of concept we consider two concrete attack scenarios: Our experiments show that an attacker can recover as much as 80%-90% of a high entropy API key with single shot monitoring. As for English text we can reach a 40% recovery rate with a single shot. We should note that the rate highly depends on the monitored token set and these rates can be improved by targeting more specialized output domains.

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