A Formal Rebuttal of "The Blockchain Trilemma: A Formal Proof of the Inherent Trade-Offs Among Decentralization, Security, and Scalability"
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2507.21111v1
- Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 15:42:39 GMT
- Title: A Formal Rebuttal of "The Blockchain Trilemma: A Formal Proof of the Inherent Trade-Offs Among Decentralization, Security, and Scalability"
- Authors: Craig Wright,
- Abstract summary: We argue that the trilemma rests on semantic equivocation, misuse of distributed systems theory, and a failure to define operational metrics.<n>We reconstruct Bitcoin as a deterministic, stateless distribution protocol governed by evidentiary trust.<n>The paper concludes by identifying systemic issues in academic discourse and peer review that have allowed such fallacies to persist.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
- Abstract: This paper presents a comprehensive refutation of the so-called "blockchain trilemma," a widely cited but formally ungrounded claim asserting an inherent trade-off between decentralisation, security, and scalability in blockchain protocols. Through formal analysis, empirical evidence, and detailed critique of both methodology and terminology, we demonstrate that the trilemma rests on semantic equivocation, misuse of distributed systems theory, and a failure to define operational metrics. Particular focus is placed on the conflation of topological network analogies with protocol-level architecture, the mischaracterisation of Bitcoin's design--including the role of miners, SPV clients, and header-based verification--and the failure to ground claims in complexity-theoretic or adversarial models. By reconstructing Bitcoin as a deterministic, stateless distribution protocol governed by evidentiary trust, we show that scalability is not a trade-off but an engineering outcome. The paper concludes by identifying systemic issues in academic discourse and peer review that have allowed such fallacies to persist, and offers formal criteria for evaluating future claims in blockchain research.
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