RX-INT: A Kernel Engine for Real-Time Detection and Analysis of In-Memory Threats
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2508.03879v1
- Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2025 19:43:25 GMT
- Title: RX-INT: A Kernel Engine for Real-Time Detection and Analysis of In-Memory Threats
- Authors: Arjun Juneja,
- Abstract summary: We present RX-INT, a kernel-assisted system featuring an architecture that provides resilience against TOCTOU attacks.<n> RX-INT introduces a detection engine that combines a real-time thread creation monitor with a stateful Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) scanner.<n>In our evaluation, RX-INT successfully detected a manually mapped region that was not identified by PE-sieve.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
- Abstract: Malware and cheat developers use fileless execution techniques to evade traditional, signature-based security products. These methods include various types of manual mapping, module stomping, and threadless injection which work entirely within the address space of a legitimate process, presenting a challenge for detection due to ambiguity between what is legitimate and what isn't. Existing tools often have weaknesses, such as a dependency on Portable Executable (PE) structures or a vulnerability to time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions where an adversary cleans up before a periodic scan has the chance to occur. To address this gap, we present RX-INT, a kernel-assisted system featuring an architecture that provides resilience against TOCTOU attacks. RX-INT introduces a detection engine that combines a real-time thread creation monitor with a stateful Virtual Address Descriptor (VAD) scanner alongside various heuristics within. This engine snapshots both private and image-backed memory regions, using real-time memory hashing to detect illicit modifications like module stomping. Critically, we demonstrate a higher detection rate in certain benchmarks of this approach through a direct comparison with PE-sieve, a commonly used and powerful memory forensics tool. In our evaluation, RX-INT successfully detected a manually mapped region that was not identified by PE-sieve. We then conclude that our architecture represents a tangible difference in the detection of fileless threats, with direct applications in the fields of anti-cheat and memory security.
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