Mitigating Data Exfiltration Attacks through Layer-Wise Learning Rate Decay Fine-Tuning
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.00027v1
- Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2025 09:05:01 GMT
- Title: Mitigating Data Exfiltration Attacks through Layer-Wise Learning Rate Decay Fine-Tuning
- Authors: Elie Thellier, Huiyu Li, Nicholas Ayache, Hervé Delingette,
- Abstract summary: Data lakes enable the training of powerful machine learning models on sensitive, high-value medical datasets.<n>Recent studies show adversaries can exfiltrate training data by embedding latent representations into model parameters.<n>We propose a simple yet effective mitigation strategy that perturbs model parameters at export time through fine-tuning with a decaying layer-wise learning rate.
- Score: 4.613829141527782
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Data lakes enable the training of powerful machine learning models on sensitive, high-value medical datasets, but also introduce serious privacy risks due to potential leakage of protected health information. Recent studies show adversaries can exfiltrate training data by embedding latent representations into model parameters or inducing memorization via multi-task learning. These attacks disguise themselves as benign utility models while enabling reconstruction of high-fidelity medical images, posing severe privacy threats with legal and ethical implications. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective mitigation strategy that perturbs model parameters at export time through fine-tuning with a decaying layer-wise learning rate to corrupt embedded data without degrading task performance. Evaluations on DermaMNIST, ChestMNIST, and MIMIC-CXR show that our approach maintains utility task performance, effectively disrupts state-of-the-art exfiltration attacks, outperforms prior defenses, and renders exfiltrated data unusable for training. Ablations and discussions on adaptive attacks highlight challenges and future directions. Our findings offer a practical defense against data leakage in data lake-trained models and centralized federated learning.
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