Reasoned Safety Alignment: Ensuring Jailbreak Defense via Answer-Then-Check
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.11629v1
- Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 06:47:35 GMT
- Title: Reasoned Safety Alignment: Ensuring Jailbreak Defense via Answer-Then-Check
- Authors: Chentao Cao, Xiaojun Xu, Bo Han, Hang Li,
- Abstract summary: We introduce a novel safety alignment approach called Answer-Then-Check.<n>Our method enables models to directly answer the question in their thought and then critically evaluate its safety.<n>We find that training on a small subset of just 500 examples can achieve comparable performance to using the full dataset.
- Score: 32.82170313959032
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capabilities, ensuring their safety against jailbreak attacks remains a critical challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel safety alignment approach called Answer-Then-Check, which enhances LLM robustness against malicious prompts by applying thinking ability to mitigate jailbreaking problems before producing a final answer to the user. Our method enables models to directly answer the question in their thought and then critically evaluate its safety before deciding whether to provide it. To implement this approach, we construct the Reasoned Safety Alignment (ReSA) dataset, comprising 80K examples that teach models to reason through direct responses and then analyze their safety. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves the Pareto frontier with superior safety capability while decreasing over-refusal rates on over-refusal benchmarks. Notably, the model fine-tuned with ReSA maintains general reasoning capabilities on benchmarks like MMLU, MATH500, and HumanEval. Besides, our method equips models with the ability to perform safe completion. Unlike post-hoc methods that can only reject harmful queries, our model can provide helpful and safe alternative responses for sensitive topics (e.g., self-harm). Furthermore, we discover that training on a small subset of just 500 examples can achieve comparable performance to using the full dataset, suggesting that safety alignment may require less data than previously assumed.
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