Inference Attacks on Encrypted Online Voting via Traffic Analysis

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.15694v1
• Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2025 07:14:01 GMT
• Title: Inference Attacks on Encrypted Online Voting via Traffic Analysis
• Authors: Anastasiia Belousova, Francesco Marchiori, Mauro Conti,
• Abstract summary: We examine how adversaries can exploit metadata from encrypted network traffic to uncover sensitive information during online voting.<n>Our analysis reveals that, even without accessing the content, it is possible to infer critical voter actions, such as whether a person votes, the exact moment a ballot is submitted, and whether the ballot is valid or spoiled.<n>We evaluate our attacks on two widely used online voting platforms, one proprietary and one partially open source, achieving classification accuracy as high as 99.5%.
• Score: 19.653420340564946
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Online voting enables individuals to participate in elections remotely, offering greater efficiency and accessibility in both governmental and organizational settings. As this method gains popularity, ensuring the security of online voting systems becomes increasingly vital, as the systems supporting it must satisfy a demanding set of security requirements. Most research in this area emphasizes the design and verification of cryptographic protocols to protect voter integrity and system confidentiality. However, other vectors, such as network traffic analysis, remain relatively understudied, even though they may pose significant threats to voter privacy and the overall trustworthiness of the system. In this paper, we examine how adversaries can exploit metadata from encrypted network traffic to uncover sensitive information during online voting. Our analysis reveals that, even without accessing the encrypted content, it is possible to infer critical voter actions, such as whether a person votes, the exact moment a ballot is submitted, and whether the ballot is valid or spoiled. We test these attacks with both rule-based techniques and machine learning methods. We evaluate our attacks on two widely used online voting platforms, one proprietary and one partially open source, achieving classification accuracy as high as 99.5%. These results expose a significant privacy vulnerability that threatens key properties of secure elections, including voter secrecy and protection against coercion or vote-buying. We explore mitigations to our attacks, demonstrating that countermeasures such as payload padding and timestamp equalization can substantially limit their effectiveness.

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