Bag of Tricks for Subverting Reasoning-based Safety Guardrails

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11570v2
• Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 20:05:11 GMT
• Title: Bag of Tricks for Subverting Reasoning-based Safety Guardrails
• Authors: Shuo Chen, Zhen Han, Haokun Chen, Bailan He, Shengyun Si, Jingpei Wu, Philip Torr, Volker Tresp, Jindong Gu,
• Abstract summary: We present a bag of jailbreak methods that subvert the reasoning-based guardrails.<n>Our attacks span white-, gray-, and black-box settings and range from effortless template manipulations to fully automated optimization.
• Score: 62.139297207938036
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Recent reasoning-based safety guardrails for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as deliberative alignment, have shown strong defense against jailbreak attacks. By leveraging LRMs' reasoning ability, these guardrails help the models to assess the safety of user inputs before generating final responses. The powerful reasoning ability can analyze the intention of the input query and will refuse to assist once it detects the harmful intent hidden by the jailbreak methods. Such guardrails have shown a significant boost in defense, such as the near-perfect refusal rates on the open-source gpt-oss series. Unfortunately, we find that these powerful reasoning-based guardrails can be extremely vulnerable to subtle manipulation of the input prompts, and once hijacked, can lead to even more harmful results. Specifically, we first uncover a surprisingly fragile aspect of these guardrails: simply adding a few template tokens to the input prompt can successfully bypass the seemingly powerful guardrails and lead to explicit and harmful responses. To explore further, we introduce a bag of jailbreak methods that subvert the reasoning-based guardrails. Our attacks span white-, gray-, and black-box settings and range from effortless template manipulations to fully automated optimization. Along with the potential for scalable implementation, these methods also achieve alarmingly high attack success rates (e.g., exceeding 90% across 5 different benchmarks on gpt-oss series on both local host models and online API services). Evaluations across various leading open-source LRMs confirm that these vulnerabilities are systemic, underscoring the urgent need for stronger alignment techniques for open-sourced LRMs to prevent malicious misuse. Code is open-sourced at https://chenxshuo.github.io/bag-of-tricks.

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