$α^3$-SecBench: A Large-Scale Evaluation Suite of Security, Resilience, and Trust for LLM-based UAV Agents over 6G Networks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2601.18754v1
• Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 18:25:07 GMT
• Title: $α^3$-SecBench: A Large-Scale Evaluation Suite of Security, Resilience, and Trust for LLM-based UAV Agents over 6G Networks
• Authors: Mohamed Amine Ferrag, Abderrahmane Lakas, Merouane Debbah,
• Abstract summary: We introduce $3$-SecBench, the first large-scale evaluation suite for assessing the security-aware autonomy of LLM-based UAV agents under realistic adversarial interference.<n>We evaluate 23 state-of-the-art LLMs from major industrial providers and leading AI labs using thousands of adversarially augmented UAV episodes sampled from a corpus of 113,475 missions spanning 175 threat types. Normalized overall scores range from 12.9% to 57.1%, highlighting a significant gap between anomaly detection and security-aware autonomous decision-making.
• Score: 3.099103925863002
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems are increasingly deployed in safety-critical, networked environments where they must operate reliably in the presence of malicious adversaries. While recent benchmarks have evaluated large language model (LLM)-based UAV agents in reasoning, navigation, and efficiency, systematic assessment of security, resilience, and trust under adversarial conditions remains largely unexplored, particularly in emerging 6G-enabled settings. We introduce $α^{3}$-SecBench, the first large-scale evaluation suite for assessing the security-aware autonomy of LLM-based UAV agents under realistic adversarial interference. Building on multi-turn conversational UAV missions from $α^{3}$-Bench, the framework augments benign episodes with 20,000 validated security overlay attack scenarios targeting seven autonomy layers, including sensing, perception, planning, control, communication, edge/cloud infrastructure, and LLM reasoning. $α^{3}$-SecBench evaluates agents across three orthogonal dimensions: security (attack detection and vulnerability attribution), resilience (safe degradation behavior), and trust (policy-compliant tool usage). We evaluate 23 state-of-the-art LLMs from major industrial providers and leading AI labs using thousands of adversarially augmented UAV episodes sampled from a corpus of 113,475 missions spanning 175 threat types. While many models reliably detect anomalous behavior, effective mitigation, vulnerability attribution, and trustworthy control actions remain inconsistent. Normalized overall scores range from 12.9% to 57.1%, highlighting a significant gap between anomaly detection and security-aware autonomous decision-making. We release $α^{3}$-SecBench on GitHub: https://github.com/maferrag/AlphaSecBench

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