Autonomous AI and Ownership Rules

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20169v1
• Date: Mon, 09 Feb 2026 18:58:52 GMT
• Title: Autonomous AI and Ownership Rules
• Authors: Frank Fagan,
• Abstract summary: In cases where AI is traceable to an originator, accession doctrine provides an efficient means of assigning ownership.<n>In strategic ownership dissolution, autonomous AI is intentionally designed to evade attribution, creating opportunities for tax arbitrage and regulatory avoidance.<n>To counteract these inefficiencies, bounty systems, private incentives, and government subsidies are proposed as mechanisms to encourage AI capture and prevent ownerless AI from distorting markets.
• Score: 0.09444500584367876
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: This Article examines the circumstances in which AI-generated outputs remain linked to their creators and the points at which they lose that connection, whether through accident, deliberate design, or emergent behavior. In cases where AI is traceable to an originator, accession doctrine provides an efficient means of assigning ownership, preserving investment incentives while maintaining accountability. When AI becomes untraceable -- whether through carelessness, deliberate obfuscation, or emergent behavior -- first possession rules can encourage reallocation to new custodians who are incentivized to integrate AI into productive use. The analysis further explores strategic ownership dissolution, where autonomous AI is intentionally designed to evade attribution, creating opportunities for tax arbitrage and regulatory avoidance. To counteract these inefficiencies, bounty systems, private incentives, and government subsidies are proposed as mechanisms to encourage AI capture and prevent ownerless AI from distorting markets.

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