Cordon-MAS: Defending RAG against Knowledge Poisoning via Information-Flow Control
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26754v1
- Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 09:27:19 GMT
- Title: Cordon-MAS: Defending RAG against Knowledge Poisoning via Information-Flow Control
- Abstract summary: Existing defenses assume that detecting poisoned evidence prevents harm.<n>We show this assumption is incorrect: models exhibit a monitoring-control gap.<n>We introduce the Cordon Principle -- no agent capable of final synthesis may access untrusted natural-language evidence.
- Score: 22.814552066611597
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) increasingly underpins high-stakes applications, yet remains vulnerable to Confundo-style poisoning where adversarially optimized documents manipulate generated outputs. Existing defenses assume that detecting poisoned evidence prevents harm. We show this assumption is incorrect: models exhibit a monitoring-control gap -- they can detect contradictions in retrieved evidence yet still act on poisoned claims. We introduce the Cordon Principle -- no agent capable of final synthesis may access untrusted natural-language evidence -- and realize it through CORDON-MAS, a compartmentalized framework that enforces this principle architecturally by separating evidence extraction, cross-source audit, and answer synthesis into agents with asymmetric memory privileges. Across five BEIR datasets, CORDON-MAS reduces attack success rate by 92.4\% relative to undefended RAG. This reframes RAG poisoning from a detection problem to an information-flow control problem.
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