ADMIT: Few-shot Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on RAG-based Fact Checking

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.13842v1
• Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2025 14:50:40 GMT
• Title: ADMIT: Few-shot Knowledge Poisoning Attacks on RAG-based Fact Checking
• Abstract summary: Knowledge poisoning poses a critical threat to Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems.<n>textbfADMIT (textbfADversarial textbfMulti-textbfInjection textbfTechnique) is a semantically aligned poisoning attack that flips fact-checking decisions.
• Score: 42.283307608442946
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Knowledge poisoning poses a critical threat to Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems by injecting adversarial content into knowledge bases, tricking Large Language Models (LLMs) into producing attacker-controlled outputs grounded in manipulated context. Prior work highlights LLMs' susceptibility to misleading or malicious retrieved content. However, real-world fact-checking scenarios are more challenging, as credible evidence typically dominates the retrieval pool. To investigate this problem, we extend knowledge poisoning to the fact-checking setting, where retrieved context includes authentic supporting or refuting evidence. We propose \textbf{ADMIT} (\textbf{AD}versarial \textbf{M}ulti-\textbf{I}njection \textbf{T}echnique), a few-shot, semantically aligned poisoning attack that flips fact-checking decisions and induces deceptive justifications, all without access to the target LLMs, retrievers, or token-level control. Extensive experiments show that ADMIT transfers effectively across 4 retrievers, 11 LLMs, and 4 cross-domain benchmarks, achieving an average attack success rate (ASR) of 86\% at an extremely low poisoning rate of $0.93 \times 10^{-6}$, and remaining robust even in the presence of strong counter-evidence. Compared with prior state-of-the-art attacks, ADMIT improves ASR by 11.2\% across all settings, exposing significant vulnerabilities in real-world RAG-based fact-checking systems.

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