Firewall3D: A Hardware Firewall for Defending 3D Printers Against Firmware Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10484v1
• Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 21:38:47 GMT
• Title: Firewall3D: A Hardware Firewall for Defending 3D Printers Against Firmware Attacks
• Abstract summary: We propose a dedicated hardware based security solution,Firewall3D, that acts as a hardware firewall for 3D printers.<n>Firewall3D monitors physical layer signals, including stepper motor currents, end stop switches, nozzle and bed temperatures and cooling fans, to verify that the printer's physical behavior matches the intended G-code execution.<n>Upon detecting abnormal behavior, the system can immediately trigger an alarm and halt the printing process, thereby preventing further damage and risks.
• Score: 0.5729426778193398
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: As the 3D printing market continues to grow rapidly, with an estimated value exceeding $30 billion, cybersecurity risks and attacks targeting additive manufacturing systems are also increasing. These attacks aim to sabotage printed components, steal intellectual property, or even physically damage the 3D printer itself. One major cybersecurity threat in this domain is firmware level attacks, which can be introduced through supply chain compromises, malicious firmware updates, or insider threats that deploy modified firmware to manipulate printer behavior. To defend against such threats, we propose a dedicated hardware based security solution,Firewall3D, that acts as a hardware firewall for 3D printers. Firewall3D continuously monitors physical layer signals, including stepper motor currents, end stop switches, nozzle and bed temperatures and cooling fans, to verify that the printer's physical behavior matches the intended G-code execution. Our experimental results demonstrate that Firewall3D can effectively detect a wide range of firmware attacks that could compromise print integrity, damage printer components, or leak intellectual property. Upon detecting abnormal behavior, the system can immediately trigger an alarm and halt the printing process, thereby preventing further damage and risks.

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