Understanding Backdoor Vulnerabilities in Vertical Federated Learning: The Gap Between Research and Practice
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12962v1
- Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 08:46:06 GMT
- Title: Understanding Backdoor Vulnerabilities in Vertical Federated Learning: The Gap Between Research and Practice
- Abstract summary: Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables organizations holding complementary features of shared entities to collaborate and train models.<n> backdoor attacks are particularly concerning because VFL not only enables malicious contributors to poison the model during training, but also allows them to activate the backdoor at inference time to manipulate predictions.<n>We present a systematic, practice-oriented study of backdoor vulnerabilities in VFL, revealing this gap in both methodological design and evaluation practices.
- Score: 12.665150044434606
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables organizations holding complementary features of shared entities to collaborate and train models. In this setting, the initiator can withhold information about the learning task, while other contributors participate without exposing their local datasets, creating an asymmetric information structure aligned with growing privacy demands. However, this asymmetry is a double-edged sword. Among various threats, backdoor attacks are particularly concerning because VFL not only enables malicious contributors to poison the model during training, but also allows them to activate the backdoor at inference time to manipulate predictions. Although prior work has reported near-perfect attack success rates and proposed effective defenses, we find that most findings fail to hold under realistic conditions, exposing a fundamental gap between research and practice. In this paper, we present a systematic, practice-oriented study of backdoor vulnerabilities in VFL, revealing this gap in both methodological design and evaluation practices. We show that existing approaches overlook key practical constraints and therefore rely on unrealistic prior knowledge. Furthermore, these limitations have remained hidden due to poorly designed evaluation practices in the literature. To bridge this gap, we redefine threat models under realistic constraints, propose practical backdoor workflows, and introduce BVBench, a backdoor-centric benchmark that enables fair, practical, and comprehensive evaluation, preloaded with state-of-the-art baselines. BVBench provides strong evidence of the fragility of the current understanding of VFL backdoor risks and establishes a foundation for steering research toward uncovering practical vulnerabilities and developing more meaningful defenses.
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