Beyond the Trust Boundary: A Critical Reassessment of the FIDO2 Threat Model

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03789v1
• Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2026 13:00:19 GMT
• Title: Beyond the Trust Boundary: A Critical Reassessment of the FIDO2 Threat Model
• Abstract summary: We show that FIDO2 depends on environmental assumptions that may not hold in practice.<n>Attack chains spanning multiple layers can bypass the intended security guarantees of FIDO2.<n> effective FIDO2 security requires layered mitigations covering the browser, operating system, hardware, protocol stack, and metadata infrastructure.
• Score: 0.1499944454332829
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: FIDO2/WebAuthn has been widely deployed as a phishing-resistant authentication scheme. Because FIDO2 relies on public-key cryptography and hardware-backed authenticators, its security is often assumed to be guaranteed by design, provided that the cryptographic implementation is correct. In this work, we critically reassess the FIDO2 threat model and show that several commonly assumed security properties do not hold under realistic deployment conditions. We extend the threat model beyond the cryptographic layer to examine eight attack vectors across the FIDO2 stack: malicious browser extensions, platform-handler malware, passive sniffing, virtual device drivers, CTAP2-specific malware, USB/hardware implants, malicious USB hubs/docks/extenders, and NFC relay attacks. Our analysis shows that FIDO2 depends on environmental assumptions that may not hold in practice. We demonstrate how AAGUID and timing information can enable user profiling and targeted attacks, and how compromise of the browser, operating system, or hardware can undermine FIDO2 security even when the underlying cryptographic primitives remain uncompromised. We further show that attack chains spanning multiple layers can bypass the intended security guarantees of FIDO2. These findings indicate that the primary weakness in a FIDO2 deployment is often not the cryptographic layer, but the surrounding trusted environment. We also examine how these attack vectors can undermine device attestation by targeting the FIDO Metadata Service (MDS3), which serves as a root of trust for authenticator metadata. Finally, we characterize the attacks according to privilege, skill, and resource requirements. We conclude that effective FIDO2 security requires layered mitigations covering the browser, operating system, hardware, protocol stack, and metadata infrastructure.

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