Short Voting Codes For Practical Code Voting

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12710v1
• Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 16:25:17 GMT
• Title: Short Voting Codes For Practical Code Voting
• Authors: Florian Moser,
• Abstract summary: We embed the mechanism in a protocol that avoids complex cryptography in both the setup and the voting phase. Trusting the setup, and one out of multiple server components, the protocol provides vote secrecy, cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast, tallied-as-recorded, eligibility and universal verifiability.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: To preserve voter secrecy on untrusted voter devices we propose to use short voting codes. This ensures voting codes remain practical even if the voter is able to select multiple voting choices. We embed the mechanism in a protocol that avoids complex cryptography in both the setup and the voting phase and relies only on standard cryptographic primitives. Trusting the setup, and one out of multiple server components, the protocol provides vote secrecy, cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast, tallied-as-recorded, eligibility and universal verifiability.

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