On Primes, Log-Loss Scores and (No) Privacy

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2009.08559v1
• Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 23:35:12 GMT
• Title: On Primes, Log-Loss Scores and (No) Privacy
• Authors: Abhinav Aggarwal, Zekun Xu, Oluwaseyi Feyisetan, Nathanael Teissier
• Abstract summary: In this paper, we prove that this additional information enables the adversary to infer the membership of any number of datapoints with full accuracy in a single query. Our approach obviates any attack model training or access to side knowledge with the adversary.
• Score: 8.679020335206753
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Membership Inference Attacks exploit the vulnerabilities of exposing models trained on customer data to queries by an adversary. In a recently proposed implementation of an auditing tool for measuring privacy leakage from sensitive datasets, more refined aggregates like the Log-Loss scores are exposed for simulating inference attacks as well as to assess the total privacy leakage based on the adversary's predictions. In this paper, we prove that this additional information enables the adversary to infer the membership of any number of datapoints with full accuracy in a single query, causing complete membership privacy breach. Our approach obviates any attack model training or access to side knowledge with the adversary. Moreover, our algorithms are agnostic to the model under attack and hence, enable perfect membership inference even for models that do not memorize or overfit. In particular, our observations provide insight into the extent of information leakage from statistical aggregates and how they can be exploited.

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