A Survey on Code-Based Cryptography
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2201.07119v5
- Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2024 15:45:58 GMT
- Title: A Survey on Code-Based Cryptography
- Authors: Violetta Weger, Niklas Gassner, Joachim Rosenthal,
- Abstract summary: A capable quantum computer can break all currently employed asymmetric cryptosystems.
NIST has initiated in 2016 a standardization process for public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) and digital signature schemes.
In 2023, NIST made an additional call for post-quantum signatures.
- Score: 0.40964539027092917
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: The improvements on quantum technology are threatening our daily cybersecurity, as a capable quantum computer can break all currently employed asymmetric cryptosystems. In preparation for the quantum-era the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has initiated in 2016 a standardization process for public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) and digital signature schemes. In 2023, NIST made an additional call for post-quantum signatures. With this chapter we aim at providing a survey on code-based cryptography, focusing on PKEs and signature schemes. We cover the main frameworks introduced in code-based cryptography and analyze their security assumptions. We provide the mathematical background in a lecture notes style, with the intention of reaching a wider audience.
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