TRIP: Coercion-resistant Registration for E-Voting with Verifiability and Usability in Votegral

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.06692v3
• Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 08:29:23 GMT
• Title: TRIP: Coercion-resistant Registration for E-Voting with Verifiability and Usability in Votegral
• Authors: Louis-Henri Merino, Simone Colombo, Rene Reyes, Alaleh Azhir, Shailesh Mishra, Pasindu Tennage, Mohammad Amin Raeisi, Haoqian Zhang, Jeff R. Allen, Bernhard Tellenbach, Vero Estrada-Galiñanes, Bryan Ford,
• Abstract summary: Votegral is a coercion-resistant voting architecture that leverages the physical security of in-person registration to address credential-issuance challenges.<n>The voter learns and can verify in the privacy booth which credential is real, but real and fake credentials thereafter appear indistinguishable to others.<n>Results with our prototype suggest that Votegral is practical and sufficiently scalable for real-world elections.
• Score: 4.589345192613584
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Online voting is convenient and flexible, but amplifies the risks of voter coercion and vote buying. One promising mitigation strategy enables voters to give a coercer fake voting credentials, which silently cast votes that do not count. Current systems along these lines make problematic assumptions about credential issuance, however, such as strong trust in a registrar and/or in voter-controlled hardware, or expecting voters to interact with multiple registrars. Votegral is the first coercion-resistant voting architecture that leverages the physical security of in-person registration to address these credential-issuance challenges, amortizing the convenience costs of in-person registration by reusing credentials across successive elections. Votegral's registration component, TRIP, gives voters a kiosk in a privacy booth with which to print real and fake credentials on paper, eliminating dependence on trusted hardware in credential issuance. The voter learns and can verify in the privacy booth which credential is real, but real and fake credentials thereafter appear indistinguishable to others. Only voters actually under coercion, a hopefully-rare case, need to trust the kiosk. To achieve verifiability, each paper credential encodes an interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is sound in real credentials but unsound in fake credentials. Voters observe the difference in the order of printing steps, but need not understand the technical details. Experimental results with our prototype suggest that Votegral is practical and sufficiently scalable for real-world elections. User-visible latency of credential issuance in TRIP is at most 19.7 seconds even on resource-constrained kiosk hardware. A companion usability study indicates that TRIP's usability is competitive with other e-voting systems, and formal proofs support TRIP's combination of coercion-resistance and verifiability.

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