Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel
Applications
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.05683v1
- Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 06:09:32 GMT
- Title: Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel
Applications
- Authors: V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Y. Narahari
- Abstract summary: We present, from relevant literature, technical details of using a deep learning approach for mechanism design.
We demonstrate the power of this approach for three illustrative case studies.
- Score: 1.2661010067882734
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
- Abstract: Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves
inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies
a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties
for a mechanism include incentive compatibility, individual rationality,
welfare maximisation, revenue maximisation (or cost minimisation), fairness of
allocation, etc. It is known from mechanism design theory that only certain
strict subsets of these properties can be simultaneously satisfied exactly by
any given mechanism. Often, the mechanisms required by real-world applications
may need a subset of these properties that are theoretically impossible to be
simultaneously satisfied. In such cases, a prominent recent approach is to use
a deep learning based approach to learn a mechanism that approximately
satisfies the required properties by minimizing a suitably defined loss
function. In this paper, we present, from relevant literature, technical
details of using a deep learning approach for mechanism design and provide an
overview of key results in this topic. We demonstrate the power of this
approach for three illustrative case studies: (a) efficient energy management
in a vehicular network (b) resource allocation in a mobile network (c)
designing a volume discount procurement auction for agricultural inputs.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
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