Learning to Control Unknown Strongly Monotone Games

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.00575v1
• Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2024 03:33:42 GMT
• Title: Learning to Control Unknown Strongly Monotone Games
• Authors: Siddharth Chandak, Ilai Bistritz, Nicholas Bambos,
• Abstract summary: We propose a simple algorithm that learns to shift the NE of the game to meet the linear constraints by adjusting the controlled coefficients online. We prove that our algorithm, which is based on two time-scale approximation, guarantees convergence with probability 1 to the set of NE that meet target linear constraints. We demonstrate how our scheme can be applied to optimizing a global quadratic cost at NE and load balancing in resource allocation games.
• Score: 16.327788209492805
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Consider $N$ players each with a $d$-dimensional action set. Each of the players' utility functions includes their reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. We assume that the game is strongly monotone, so if each player runs gradient descent, the dynamics converge to a unique Nash equilibrium (NE). The NE is typically inefficient in terms of global performance. The resulting global performance of the system can be improved by imposing $K$-dimensional linear constraints on the NE. We therefore want the manager to pick the controlled coefficients that impose the desired constraint on the NE. However, this requires knowing the players' reward functions and their action sets. Obtaining this game structure information is infeasible in a large-scale network and violates the users' privacy. To overcome this, we propose a simple algorithm that learns to shift the NE of the game to meet the linear constraints by adjusting the controlled coefficients online. Our algorithm only requires the linear constraints violation as feedback and does not need to know the reward functions or the action sets. We prove that our algorithm, which is based on two time-scale stochastic approximation, guarantees convergence with probability 1 to the set of NE that meet target linear constraints. We then provide a mean square convergence rate of $O(t^{-1/4})$ for our algorithm. This is the first such bound for two time-scale stochastic approximation where the slower time-scale is a fixed point iteration with a non-expansive mapping. We demonstrate how our scheme can be applied to optimizing a global quadratic cost at NE and load balancing in resource allocation games. We provide simulations of our algorithm for these scenarios.

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