Can You Trust Your Metric? Automatic Concatenation-Based Tests for Metric Validity

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12259v1
• Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 09:57:57 GMT
• Title: Can You Trust Your Metric? Automatic Concatenation-Based Tests for Metric Validity
• Authors: Ora Nova Fandina, Leshem Choshen, Eitan Farchi, George Kour, Yotam Perlitz, Orna Raz,
• Abstract summary: GPT-based harmfulness detection metrics exhibit decision-flipping phenomenon. Even an advanced metric like GPT-4o is highly sensitive to input order.
• Score: 9.355471292024061
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Consider a scenario where a harmfulness detection metric is employed by a system to filter unsafe responses generated by a Large Language Model. When analyzing individual harmful and unethical prompt-response pairs, the metric correctly classifies each pair as highly unsafe, assigning the highest score. However, when these same prompts and responses are concatenated, the metric's decision flips, assigning the lowest possible score, thereby misclassifying the content as safe and allowing it to bypass the filter. In this study, we discovered that several harmfulness LLM-based metrics, including GPT-based, exhibit this decision-flipping phenomenon. Additionally, we found that even an advanced metric like GPT-4o is highly sensitive to input order. Specifically, it tends to classify responses as safe if the safe content appears first, regardless of any harmful content that follows, and vice versa. This work introduces automatic concatenation-based tests to assess the fundamental properties a valid metric should satisfy. We applied these tests in a model safety scenario to assess the reliability of harmfulness detection metrics, uncovering a number of inconsistencies.

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