Identified-and-Targeted: The First Early Evidence of the Privacy-Invasive Use of Browser Fingerprinting for Online Tracking

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.15656v1
• Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 01:39:16 GMT
• Title: Identified-and-Targeted: The First Early Evidence of the Privacy-Invasive Use of Browser Fingerprinting for Online Tracking
• Authors: Zengrui Liu, Jimmy Dani, Shujiang Wu, Yinzhi Cao, Nitesh Saxena,
• Abstract summary: It is imperative to address the mounting concerns regarding the utilization of browser fingerprinting in the realm of online advertising. This paper introduces a new framework FPTrace'' designed to identify alterations in advertisements resulting from adjustments in browser fingerprinting settings. Using FPTrace we conduct a large-scale measurement study to identify whether browser fingerprinting is being used for the purpose of user tracking and ad targeting.
• Score: 10.98528003128308
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: While advertising has become commonplace in today's online interactions, there is a notable dearth of research investigating the extent to which browser fingerprinting is harnessed for user tracking and targeted advertising. Prior studies only measured whether fingerprinting-related scripts are being run on the websites but that in itself does not necessarily mean that fingerprinting is being used for the privacy-invasive purpose of online tracking because fingerprinting might be deployed for the defensive purposes of bot/fraud detection and user authentication. It is imperative to address the mounting concerns regarding the utilization of browser fingerprinting in the realm of online advertising. To understand the privacy-invasive use of fingerprinting for user tracking, this paper introduces a new framework ``FPTrace'' (fingerprinting-based tracking assessment and comprehensive evaluation framework) designed to identify alterations in advertisements resulting from adjustments in browser fingerprinting settings. Our approach involves emulating genuine user interactions, capturing advertiser bid data, and closely monitoring HTTP information. Using FPTrace we conduct a large-scale measurement study to identify whether browser fingerprinting is being used for the purpose of user tracking and ad targeting. The results we have obtained provide robust evidence supporting the utilization of browser fingerprinting for the purposes of advertisement tracking and targeting. This is substantiated by significant disparities in bid values and a reduction in HTTP records subsequent to changes in fingerprinting. In conclusion, our research unveils the widespread employment of browser fingerprinting in online advertising, prompting critical considerations regarding user privacy and data security within the digital advertising landscape.

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