Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.02785v1
- Date: Tue, 05 Nov 2024 03:51:13 GMT
- Title: Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment
- Authors: Jason Vega, Junsheng Huang, Gaokai Zhang, Hangoo Kang, Minjia Zhang, Gagandeep Singh,
- Abstract summary: In this paper, we study how simple random augmentations to the input prompt affect safety alignment effectiveness in state-of-the-art LLMs.
We show that low-resource and unsophisticated attackers can significantly improve their chances of bypassing alignment with just 25 random augmentations per prompt.
- Score: 16.5939079098358
- License:
- Abstract: Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has recently become a critical objective of model developers. In response, a growing body of work has been investigating how safety alignment can be bypassed through various jailbreaking methods, such as adversarial attacks. However, these jailbreak methods can be rather costly or involve a non-trivial amount of creativity and effort, introducing the assumption that malicious users are high-resource or sophisticated. In this paper, we study how simple random augmentations to the input prompt affect safety alignment effectiveness in state-of-the-art LLMs, such as Llama 3 and Qwen 2. We perform an in-depth evaluation of 17 different models and investigate the intersection of safety under random augmentations with multiple dimensions: augmentation type, model size, quantization, fine-tuning-based defenses, and decoding strategies (e.g., sampling temperature). We show that low-resource and unsophisticated attackers, i.e. $\textit{stochastic monkeys}$, can significantly improve their chances of bypassing alignment with just 25 random augmentations per prompt.
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