K-Gate Lock: Multi-Key Logic Locking Using Input Encoding Against Oracle-Guided Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.02118v1
• Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2025 22:07:38 GMT
• Title: K-Gate Lock: Multi-Key Logic Locking Using Input Encoding Against Oracle-Guided Attacks
• Authors: Kevin Lopez, Amin Rezaei,
• Abstract summary: K-Gate Lock encodes input patterns using multiple keys that are applied to one set of key inputs at different operational times. Uses multiple keys will make the circuit secure against oracle-guided attacks and increase attacker efforts to an exponentially time-consuming brute force search.
• Score: 1.104960878651584
• License:
• Abstract: Logic locking has emerged to prevent piracy and overproduction of integrated circuits ever since the split of the design house and manufacturing foundry was established. While there has been a lot of research using a single global key to lock the circuit, even the most sophisticated single-key locking methods have been shown to be vulnerable to powerful SAT-based oracle-guided attacks that can extract the correct key with the help of an activated chip bought off the market and the locked netlist leaked from the untrusted foundry. To address this challenge, we propose, implement, and evaluate a novel logic locking method called K-Gate Lock that encodes input patterns using multiple keys that are applied to one set of key inputs at different operational times. Our comprehensive experimental results confirm that using multiple keys will make the circuit secure against oracle-guided attacks and increase attacker efforts to an exponentially time-consuming brute force search. K-Gate Lock has reasonable power and performance overheads, making it a practical solution for real-world hardware intellectual property protection.

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