Ransomware IR Model: Proactive Threat Intelligence-Based Incident Response Strategy
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.01221v1
- Date: Mon, 03 Feb 2025 10:25:26 GMT
- Title: Ransomware IR Model: Proactive Threat Intelligence-Based Incident Response Strategy
- Authors: Anthony Cheuk Tung Lai, Ping Fan Ke, Alan Ho,
- Abstract summary: There is no clear and proven published incident response strategy to satisfy different business priorities and objectives under ransomware attack in detail.
In this paper, we quote one of our representative front-line ransomware incident response experiences for Company X.
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- Abstract: Ransomware impact different organizations for years, it causes huge monetary, reputation loss and operation impact. Other than typical data encryption by ransomware, attackers can request ransom from the victim organizations via data extortion, otherwise, attackers will publish stolen data publicly in their ransomware dashboard forum and data-sharing platforms. However, there is no clear and proven published incident response strategy to satisfy different business priorities and objectives under ransomware attack in detail. In this paper, we quote one of our representative front-line ransomware incident response experiences for Company X. Organization and incident responder can reference our established model strategy and implement proactive threat intelligence-based incident response architecture if one is under ransomware attack, which helps to respond the incident more effectively and speedy.
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