Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.05949v1
• Date: Sun, 09 Feb 2025 16:30:34 GMT
• Title: Verifying Proportionality in Temporal Voting
• Authors: Edith Elkind, Svetlana Obraztsova, Jannik Peters, Nicholas Teh,
• Abstract summary: We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates. We focus on the complexity of verifying whether a given outcome offers proportional representation.
• Score: 29.69443607539022
• License:
• Abstract: We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of justified representation as well as voting rules that provide strong representation guarantees from the multiwinner election setting to this model. In our work, we focus on the complexity of verifying whether a given outcome offers proportional representation. We show that in the temporal setting verification is strictly harder than in multiwinner voting, but identify natural special cases that enable efficient algorithms.

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