ADAGE: Active Defenses Against GNN Extraction

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2503.00065v2
• Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2025 11:32:39 GMT
• Title: ADAGE: Active Defenses Against GNN Extraction
• Authors: Jing Xu, Franziska Boenisch, Adam Dziedzic,
• Abstract summary: Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) achieve high performance in various real-world applications, such as drug discovery, traffic states prediction, and recommendation systems.<n>The threat vector of stealing attacks against GNNs is large and diverse.<n>We propose the first and general Active Defense Against GNN Extraction (ADAGE)
• Score: 9.707239870468735
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) achieve high performance in various real-world applications, such as drug discovery, traffic states prediction, and recommendation systems. The fact that building powerful GNNs requires a large amount of training data, powerful computing resources, and human expertise turns the models into lucrative targets for model stealing attacks. Prior work has revealed that the threat vector of stealing attacks against GNNs is large and diverse, as an attacker can leverage various heterogeneous signals ranging from node labels to high-dimensional node embeddings to create a local copy of the target GNN at a fraction of the original training costs. This diversity in the threat vector renders the design of effective and general defenses challenging and existing defenses usually focus on one particular stealing setup. Additionally, they solely provide means to identify stolen model copies rather than preventing the attack. To close this gap, we propose the first and general Active Defense Against GNN Extraction (ADAGE). By analyzing the queries to the GNN, tracking their diversity in terms of proximity to different communities identified in the underlying graph, and increasing the defense strength with the growing fraction of communities that have been queried, ADAGE can prevent stealing in all common attack setups. Our extensive experimental evaluation using six benchmark datasets, four GNN models, and three types of adaptive attackers shows that ADAGE penalizes attackers to the degree of rendering stealing impossible, whilst not harming predictive performance for legitimate users. ADAGE, thereby, contributes towards securely sharing valuable GNNs in the future.

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