Modeling Behavioral Preferences of Cyber Adversaries Using Inverse Reinforcement Learning

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03817v1
• Date: Fri, 02 May 2025 18:20:14 GMT
• Title: Modeling Behavioral Preferences of Cyber Adversaries Using Inverse Reinforcement Learning
• Authors: Aditya Shinde, Prashant Doshi,
• Abstract summary: This paper presents a holistic approach to attacker preference modeling from system-level audit logs using inverse reinforcement learning (IRL)<n>We learn the behavioral preferences of cyber adversaries from forensics data on their tools and techniques.<n>Our results demonstrate for the first time that low-level forensics data can automatically reveal an adversary's subjective preferences.
• Score: 4.5456862813416565
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: This paper presents a holistic approach to attacker preference modeling from system-level audit logs using inverse reinforcement learning (IRL). Adversary modeling is an important capability in cybersecurity that lets defenders characterize behaviors of potential attackers, which enables attribution to known cyber adversary groups. Existing approaches rely on documenting an ever-evolving set of attacker tools and techniques to track known threat actors. Although attacks evolve constantly, attacker behavioral preferences are intrinsic and less volatile. Our approach learns the behavioral preferences of cyber adversaries from forensics data on their tools and techniques. We model the attacker as an expert decision-making agent with unknown behavioral preferences situated in a computer host. We leverage attack provenance graphs of audit logs to derive a state-action trajectory of the attack. We test our approach on open datasets of audit logs containing real attack data. Our results demonstrate for the first time that low-level forensics data can automatically reveal an adversary's subjective preferences, which serves as an additional dimension to modeling and documenting cyber adversaries. Attackers' preferences tend to be invariant despite their different tools and indicate predispositions that are inherent to the attacker. As such, these inferred preferences can potentially serve as unique behavioral signatures of attackers and improve threat attribution.

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