Military AI Needs Technically-Informed Regulation to Safeguard AI Research and its Applications

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.18371v1
• Date: Fri, 23 May 2025 20:58:38 GMT
• Title: Military AI Needs Technically-Informed Regulation to Safeguard AI Research and its Applications
• Authors: Riley Simmons-Edler, Jean Dong, Paul Lushenko, Kanaka Rajan, Ryan P. Badman,
• Abstract summary: We focus on a subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions.<n>These risks threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research.<n>We propose a behavior-based definition of AI-LAWS as a foundation for technically grounded regulation.
• Score: 1.4347154947542533
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks -- including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight -- all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research. These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue that AI researchers must be involved throughout the regulatory lifecycle. Thus, we propose a clear, behavior-based definition of AI-LAWS -- systems that introduce unique risks through their use of modern AI -- as a foundation for technically grounded regulation, given that existing frameworks do not distinguish them from conventional LAWS. Using this definition, we propose several technically-informed policy directions and invite greater participation from the AI research community in military AI policy discussions.

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