Wisdom of Crowds Through Myopic Self-Confidence Adaptation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18195v1
• Date: Sun, 22 Jun 2025 22:55:17 GMT
• Title: Wisdom of Crowds Through Myopic Self-Confidence Adaptation
• Authors: Giacomo Como, Fabio Fagnani, Anton Proskurnikov,
• Abstract summary: The wisdom of crowds is an umbrella term for phenomena suggesting that the collective judgment or decision of a large group can be more accurate than the individual judgments or decisions of the group members.<n>In this paper, we consider a group of agents who initially possess uncorrelated and unbiased measurements of a common state of the world.<n>Assume these agents iteratively update their estimates according to a simple non-Bayesian learning rule, commonly known in sociology as the French-DeGroot dynamics or iterative opinion pooling.
• Score: 1.1060425537315088
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: The wisdom of crowds is an umbrella term for phenomena suggesting that the collective judgment or decision of a large group can be more accurate than the individual judgments or decisions of the group members. A well-known example illustrating this concept is the competition at a country fair described by Galton, where the median value of the individual guesses about the weight of an ox resulted in an astonishingly accurate estimate of the actual weight. This phenomenon resembles classical results in probability theory and relies on independent decision-making. The accuracy of the group's final decision can be significantly reduced if the final agents' opinions are driven by a few influential agents. In this paper, we consider a group of agents who initially possess uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common state of the world. Assume these agents iteratively update their estimates according to a simple non-Bayesian learning rule, commonly known in mathematical sociology as the French-DeGroot dynamics or iterative opinion pooling. As a result of this iterative distributed averaging process, each agent arrives at an asymptotic estimate of the state of the world, with the variance of this estimate determined by the matrix of weights the agents assign to each other. Every agent aims at minimizing the variance of her asymptotic estimate of the state of the world; however, such variance is also influenced by the weights allocated by other agents. To achieve the best possible estimate, the agents must then solve a game-theoretic, multi-objective optimization problem defined by the available sets of influence weights. We characterize both the Pareto frontier and the set of Nash equilibria in the resulting game. Additionally, we examine asynchronous best-response dynamics for the group of agents and prove their convergence to the set of strict Nash equilibria.

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