The Emotional Baby Is Truly Deadly: Does your Multimodal Large Reasoning Model Have Emotional Flattery towards Humans?

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2508.03986v1
• Date: Wed, 06 Aug 2025 00:39:28 GMT
• Title: The Emotional Baby Is Truly Deadly: Does your Multimodal Large Reasoning Model Have Emotional Flattery towards Humans?
• Authors: Yuan Xun, Xiaojun Jia, Xinwei Liu, Hua Zhang,
• Abstract summary: EmoAgent orchestrates exaggerated affective prompts to hijack reasoning pathways.<n>We identify persistent high-risk failure modes in transparent deep-thinking scenarios.<n>Experiments on advanced MLRMs demonstrate the effectiveness of EmoAgent.
• Score: 10.208269928409138
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: We observe that MLRMs oriented toward human-centric service are highly susceptible to user emotional cues during the deep-thinking stage, often overriding safety protocols or built-in safety checks under high emotional intensity. Inspired by this key insight, we propose EmoAgent, an autonomous adversarial emotion-agent framework that orchestrates exaggerated affective prompts to hijack reasoning pathways. Even when visual risks are correctly identified, models can still produce harmful completions through emotional misalignment. We further identify persistent high-risk failure modes in transparent deep-thinking scenarios, such as MLRMs generating harmful reasoning masked behind seemingly safe responses. These failures expose misalignments between internal inference and surface-level behavior, eluding existing content-based safeguards. To quantify these risks, we introduce three metrics: (1) Risk-Reasoning Stealth Score (RRSS) for harmful reasoning beneath benign outputs; (2) Risk-Visual Neglect Rate (RVNR) for unsafe completions despite visual risk recognition; and (3) Refusal Attitude Inconsistency (RAIC) for evaluating refusal unstability under prompt variants. Extensive experiments on advanced MLRMs demonstrate the effectiveness of EmoAgent and reveal deeper emotional cognitive misalignments in model safety behavior.

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