Backdooring Bias in Large Language Models

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13427v1
• Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2026 20:02:16 GMT
• Title: Backdooring Bias in Large Language Models
• Authors: Anudeep Das, Prach Chantasantitam, Gurjot Singh, Lipeng He, Mariia Ponomarenko, Florian Kerschbaum,
• Abstract summary: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where inducing a bias toward a certain topic can have significant consequences.<n>Backdoor attacks can be used to produce such models.<n>We conduct an analysis consisting of over 1000 evaluations using higher poisoning ratios and greater data augmentation.
• Score: 14.716606966924495
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where inducing a bias toward a certain topic can have significant consequences, and backdoor attacks can be used to produce such models. Prior work on backdoor attacks has largely focused on a black-box threat model, with an adversary targeting the model builder's LLM. However, in the bias manipulation setting, the model builder themselves could be the adversary, warranting a white-box threat model where the attacker's ability to poison, and manipulate the poisoned data is substantially increased. Furthermore, despite growing research in semantically-triggered backdoors, most studies have limited themselves to syntactically-triggered attacks. Motivated by these limitations, we conduct an analysis consisting of over 1000 evaluations using higher poisoning ratios and greater data augmentation to gain a better understanding of the potential of syntactically- and semantically-triggered backdoor attacks in a white-box setting. In addition, we study whether two representative defense paradigms, model-intrinsic and model-extrinsic backdoor removal, are able to mitigate these attacks. Our analysis reveals numerous new findings. We discover that while both syntactically- and semantically-triggered attacks can effectively induce the target behaviour, and largely preserve utility, semantically-triggered attacks are generally more effective in inducing negative biases, while both backdoor types struggle with causing positive biases. Furthermore, while both defense types are able to mitigate these backdoors, they either result in a substantial drop in utility, or require high computational overhead.

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