MCP-DPT: A Defense-Placement Taxonomy and Coverage Analysis for Model Context Protocol Security

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2604.07551v1
• Date: Wed, 08 Apr 2026 19:53:26 GMT
• Title: MCP-DPT: A Defense-Placement Taxonomy and Coverage Analysis for Model Context Protocol Security
• Abstract summary: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models to discover and invoke third-party tools.<n> MCP exposes pre-execution artifacts, shared context, multi-turn, and third-party supply chains to adversarial influence.<n>We present a defense-placement-oriented security analysis of MCP, introducing a layer-aligned taxonomy that organizes attacks by the architectural component responsible for enforcement.
• Score: 1.4734406074896924
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models (LLMs) to dynamically discover and invoke third-party tools, significantly expanding agent capabilities while introducing a distinct security landscape. Unlike prompt-only interactions, MCP exposes pre-execution artifacts, shared context, multi-turn workflows, and third-party supply chains to adversarial influence across independently operated components. While recent work has identified MCP-specific attacks and evaluated defenses, existing studies are largely attack-centric or benchmark-driven, providing limited guidance on where mitigation responsibility should reside within the MCP architecture. This is problematic given MCP's multi-party design and distributed trust boundaries. We present a defense-placement-oriented security analysis of MCP, introducing a layer-aligned taxonomy that organizes attacks by the architectural component responsible for enforcement. Threats are mapped across six MCP layers, and primary and secondary defense points are identified to support principled defense-in-depth reasoning under adversaries controlling tools, servers, or ecosystem components. A structured mapping of existing academic and industry defenses onto this framework reveals uneven and predominantly tool-centric protection, with persistent gaps at the host orchestration, transport, and supply-chain layers. These findings suggest that many MCP security weaknesses stem from architectural misalignment rather than isolated implementation flaws.

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