Sequential Strategic Classification with Multi-Stage Selective Classifiers
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.04202v1
- Date: Tue, 05 May 2026 18:42:21 GMT
- Title: Sequential Strategic Classification with Multi-Stage Selective Classifiers
- Abstract summary: We study the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes.<n>Prior works have demonstrated a fundamental inability to get out of this conundrum by only focusing on the design of a classifier.<n>This paper introduces a sequential, multi-stage model of strategic classification, by capturing how agents adapt their behavior.
- Score: 11.395181681423892
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly than genuine efforts. Prior works have demonstrated a fundamental inability to get out of this conundrum by only focusing on the design of a classifier. We note that prior work also heavily focuses on either one-shot settings or repeated interaction with the same classifier. Real-world decision making is often multi-stage, involving a sequence of potentially different classifiers as an agent progresses. This paper introduces a sequential, stochastic, multi-stage model of strategic classification, by capturing how agents adapt their behavior, through improvement actions (enhancing both observable features and true attributes) and gaming actions (enhancing only observable features), over multiple levels of classification with increasing difficulty as well as reward. For each level, we adopt a selective classifier that can abstain from making a prediction at low confidence. Consequently, a positive (resp. negative) outcome leads to promotion (resp. demotion) of the agent to the next higher (resp. lower) level, while abstention keeps the agent at the same level. We fully characterize the agent's optimal instantaneous action under selective classifiers and compare the long-term properties and utility of the agent repeatedly following an optimal myopic policy of either no-improvement (never choose the improvement action) or no-gaming (never choose the gaming action). We further examine design principles over the sequence of classifiers that yield higher long-term utility for the latter policy, thereby effectively incentivizing genuine effort in the long run.
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