GRAFT: Graphlet-Triggered Backdoor Attack on GNN-Based Hardware Security Systems
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.10163v1
- Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2026 20:47:54 GMT
- Title: GRAFT: Graphlet-Triggered Backdoor Attack on GNN-Based Hardware Security Systems
- Abstract summary: We propose GRAFT, a graph let-triggered backdoor attack targeting GNN-based hardware security.<n>GRAFT embeds graphlet-based triggers at either the register-transfer level (RTL) or gate level of the design while preserving the circuit's original function.<n>Our experimental results demonstrate that GRAFT can effectively evade HT detection and IP piracy detection, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) of up to 100%.
- Score: 1.295259696641579
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: The globalization of the integrated circuit (IC) supply chain increases the risk of security threats, such as hardware Trojans (HTs) and the theft of intellectual property (IP). Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), among the most powerful deep learning methods for processing graph-structured data, have been widely adopted to detect such threats. However, GNNs are susceptible to backdoor attacks that can maliciously manipulate output predictions toward an adversarial target. These attacks are not only difficult to detect but also compromise the integrity of GNN-based security systems. Most prior work embeds backdoor triggers using randomly generated subgraphs or gradient-guided generative subgraphs. However, such triggers are impractical for GNN-based hardware security applications as they do not guarantee the preservation of circuit functionality. In this paper, we propose GRAFT, a graph let-triggered backdoor attack targeting GNN-based hardware security. GRAFT embeds graphlet-based triggers at either the register-transfer level (RTL) or gate level of the design while preserving the circuit 's original function. We evaluate GRAFT on the ISCAS-85 and TrustHub datasets. Our experimental results demonstrate that GRAFT can effectively evade HT detection and IP piracy detection, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) of up to 100%.
Related papers
- Defending against Model Extraction for GNNs with Model Reprogramming [57.82196268649236]
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) serve as the backbone for high-stakes applications in Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (ML)<n>Still, their black-box deployment exposes them to Model Extraction (ME) attacks.<n>Existing defenses suffer from a critical ''Euclidean bias''<n>We propose GraphRP, a proactive defense framework that repurposes Model Reprogramming for security.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-08-11T23:20:15Z) - Leaking Circuit Secrets: Gradient Leakage Attacks on Graph Neural Networks [6.1625231866179595]
We present the first comprehensive evaluation of gradient leakage attacks (GLAs) on graph neural networks (GNNs)<n>GLAs can expose sensitive information, such as gate types and distinctive properties of hardware Trojans.<n>We evaluate several SOTA defense techniques, including differential privacy, gradient clipping, secure aggregation, model compression with quantization, and adversarial training.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-06-24T08:59:28Z) - Towards Effective, Stealthy, and Persistent Backdoor Attacks Targeting Graph Foundation Models [62.87838888016534]
Graph Foundation Models (GFMs) are pre-trained on diverse source domains and adapted to unseen targets.<n>Backdoor attacks against GFMs are non-trivial due to three key challenges.<n>We propose GFM-BA, a novel Backdoor Attack model against Graph Foundation Models.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-11-22T08:52:09Z) - Boosting Graph Robustness Against Backdoor Attacks: An Over-Similarity Perspective [11.671718919130099]
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved notable success in tasks such as social and transportation networks.<n>Recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of GNNs to backdoor attacks, raising significant concerns about their reliability in real-world applications.<n>We propose a novel graph backdoor defense method SimGuard.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-02-03T11:41:42Z) - Grimm: A Plug-and-Play Perturbation Rectifier for Graph Neural Networks Defending against Poisoning Attacks [53.972077392749185]
Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of graph neural networks (GNNs) to adversarial poisoning attacks on node classification tasks.<n>Here we introduce Grimm, the first plug-and-play defense model.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-12-11T17:17:02Z) - MADE: Graph Backdoor Defense with Masked Unlearning [24.97718571096943]
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have garnered significant attention from researchers due to their outstanding performance in handling graph-related tasks.<n>Recent research has demonstrated that GNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, implemented by injecting triggers into the training datasets.<n>This vulnerability poses significant security risks for applications of GNNs in sensitive domains, such as drug discovery.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-11-26T22:50:53Z) - Link Stealing Attacks Against Inductive Graph Neural Networks [60.931106032824275]
A graph neural network (GNN) is a type of neural network that is specifically designed to process graph-structured data.
Previous work has shown that transductive GNNs are vulnerable to a series of privacy attacks.
This paper conducts a comprehensive privacy analysis of inductive GNNs through the lens of link stealing attacks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-05-09T14:03:52Z) - AttackGNN: Red-Teaming GNNs in Hardware Security Using Reinforcement
Learning [16.751700469734708]
We propose AttackGNN, the first red-team attack on GNN-based techniques in hardware security.
We target five GNN-based techniques for four crucial classes of problems in hardware security: IP piracy, detecting/localizing HTs, reverse engineering, and hardware obfuscation.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-02-21T17:18:25Z) - Transferable Graph Backdoor Attack [13.110473828583725]
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved tremendous success in many graph mining tasks.
GNNs are found to be vulnerable to unnoticeable perturbations on both graph structure and node features.
In this paper, we disclose the TRAP attack, a Transferable GRAPh backdoor attack.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-06-21T06:25:37Z) - Adversarial Attack on Large Scale Graph [58.741365277995044]
Recent studies have shown that graph neural networks (GNNs) are vulnerable against perturbations due to lack of robustness.
Currently, most works on attacking GNNs are mainly using gradient information to guide the attack and achieve outstanding performance.
We argue that the main reason is that they have to use the whole graph for attacks, resulting in the increasing time and space complexity as the data scale grows.
We present a practical metric named Degree Assortativity Change (DAC) to measure the impacts of adversarial attacks on graph data.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-09-08T02:17:55Z) - Graph Backdoor [53.70971502299977]
We present GTA, the first backdoor attack on graph neural networks (GNNs)
GTA departs in significant ways: it defines triggers as specific subgraphs, including both topological structures and descriptive features.
It can be instantiated for both transductive (e.g., node classification) and inductive (e.g., graph classification) tasks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-06-21T19:45:30Z) - Graph Structure Learning for Robust Graph Neural Networks [63.04935468644495]
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are powerful tools in representation learning for graphs.
Recent studies show that GNNs are vulnerable to carefully-crafted perturbations, called adversarial attacks.
We propose a general framework Pro-GNN, which can jointly learn a structural graph and a robust graph neural network model.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-05-20T17:07:05Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.