TroPUF: Evaluating Hardware Trojan Insertion in Delay-Based Physical Unclonable Functions

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.23418v1
• Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 02:33:49 GMT
• Title: TroPUF: Evaluating Hardware Trojan Insertion in Delay-Based Physical Unclonable Functions
• Abstract summary: Delay-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are commonly used for device authentication and key generation.<n>The act of embedding hardware Trojans directly inside the PUF primitive presents a unique security risk that is not yet well understood.
• Score: 0.5156484100374058
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Delay-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are commonly used for device authentication and key generation due to the fact that they rely on manufacturing induced delay variations. However, these same variations make PUFs inherently non-deterministic, which can allow malicious logic to blend in with normal circuit behavior. As a result, the act of embedding hardware Trojans directly inside the PUF primitive presents a unique security risk that is not yet well understood. This work presents a unified simulation framework for evaluating stealthy hardware Trojan insertion across multiple delay-based PUF architectures and Trojan types. Functional metrics, hardware overhead, and resistance to machine learning modeling are assessed in parallel. Results show that dormant Trojans preserve expected PUF behavior, structural characteristics, and modeling resistance. Detectable degradation appears only after activation, indicating that conventional validation techniques fail to identify embedded Trojans prior to payload execution. These findings expose a gap in current PUF security assumptions, and highlight the need to evaluate PUFs and hardware Trojans as a coupled security problem.

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