Optimistic Verifiable Claims: A Blockchain Protocol for Conditionally Confidential Bidding in Decentralized Manufacturing

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.25517v1
• Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 09:59:43 GMT
• Title: Optimistic Verifiable Claims: A Blockchain Protocol for Conditionally Confidential Bidding in Decentralized Manufacturing
• Abstract summary: Optimistic Verifiable Claim (OVC) is a blockchain protocol that lets a Consumer publish a verifiable claim about a concealed design.<n>Every service incurs the cost of posting the encrypted design, with or without a dispute.<n>OVC makes confidential, claim-based bidding economically feasible on Arbitrum and opBNB, but not on industrial scale.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Decentralized manufacturing faces a pre-contractual impasse: a Provider cannot price a service accurately without inspecting the design file, yet the Consumer cannot share that file without exposing intellectual property. We introduce the Optimistic Verifiable Claim (OVC), a blockchain protocol that lets a Consumer publish a verifiable claim about a concealed design (such as the material it consumes) and a Provider price and bid on it without seeing the design. The claim is committed when the service is posted and stands unless the selected Provider challenges it; a challenge triggers a deterministic on-chain check that exposes any dishonesty, and the design is disclosed only to settle a dispute, never on the honest path. We implement four checks (authorized key access, delivery-channel integrity, syntactic conformance, and declared material consumption) in Solidity and measure them on a real 6.41 MB G-code file, the 3DBenchy, across Ethereum, Arbitrum, and opBNB. Every service incurs the cost of posting the encrypted design, with or without a dispute. For the 3DBenchy, the no-dispute outcome costs \$7,207 in up to 9 hours on Ethereum, \$288 in 3 min on Arbitrum, and \$2.87 in 2 min on opBNB, and a fully contested dispute costs \$49,660 in up to 57 hours on Ethereum, \$1,988 in 19 min on Arbitrum, and \$19.73 in 13 min on opBNB. Costs and times grow with size: for a 50 MB industrial design, an undisputed service reaches \$56,173 and up to 3 days on Ethereum against \$22.36 and 16 min on opBNB, and a fully contested dispute reaches \$488,440 over up to 18 days on Ethereum against \$195 and 1.6 hours on opBNB. Of the four, the material-consumption check is the costliest, its predicate being the most expensive to evaluate on-chain. OVC makes confidential, claim-based bidding economically feasible on Arbitrum and opBNB, but not on Ethereum at industrial scale.

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