ARMOR: Manifold-Oriented Training for Adversarially Robust Aerial Object Detection under Data Scarcity
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29510v2
- Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2026 22:24:28 GMT
- Title: ARMOR: Manifold-Oriented Training for Adversarially Robust Aerial Object Detection under Data Scarcity
- Abstract summary: We propose Adversarial Robustness with Manifold-Oriented Training (ARMOR) to tackle model vulnerability and training data scarcity.<n>ARMOR realizes the core insights of on-manifold adversarial training (OMAT) in low-data regimes.<n>ARMOR maintains strong clean performance of over 0.90 model confidence, while improving adversarial robustness by up to 0.32 in model confidence over state-of-the-art defenses.
- Score: 29.552503716131568
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Aerial object detection is increasingly deployed in real-world applications, but models remain vulnerable to physical, universal adversarial patches that cause them to miss objects. Furthermore, defenders face the practical constraint of training data scarcity: aerial imagery is costly to collect and label, so a deployment site typically yields hundreds of images rather than the tens of thousands that adversarial robustness benchmarks assume. To tackle model vulnerability and training data scarcity, we propose Adversarial Robustness with Manifold-Oriented Training (ARMOR), a novel defense that realizes the core insights of on-manifold adversarial training (OMAT) in low-data regimes. ARMOR builds on the insight of OMAT to model the data manifold - the compact structure capturing the data's relevant features - to learn and robustify these features during training. While OMAT relies on the data-intensive operations of training large generative models and adversarial training to achieve this, ARMOR adopts a data-efficient approach that reuses labels the detection task already supplies: ARMOR (i) masks image backgrounds to retain object-relevant features, and (ii) injects randomized patches on objects to improve feature robustness. Our low-data experiments with physically-realizable adversarial patches evaluate both query-free transfer attacks and defense-aware attacks. ARMOR maintains strong clean performance of over 0.90 model confidence, while improving adversarial robustness by up to 0.32 in model confidence over state-of-the-art defenses. Physical experiments with printed patches confirm that these gains survive deployment. Overall, ARMOR translates insights from manifold-based training to defend object detectors amidst training data scarcity.
Related papers
- Deepfake detectors are DUMB: A benchmark to assess adversarial training robustness under transferability constraints [0.0]
We extend the DUMB -- dataset soUrces, Model architecture and Balance - and DUMBer methodology to deepfake detection.<n>We evaluate robustness detectors against adversarial attacks under transferability constraints and cross-dataset configuration.<n>Experiments show that adversarial training strategies reinforce robustness in the in-distribution cases but can also degrade it under cross-dataset configuration depending on the strategy adopted.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-01-09T18:06:19Z) - Mitigating Data Exfiltration Attacks through Layer-Wise Learning Rate Decay Fine-Tuning [4.613829141527782]
Data lakes enable the training of powerful machine learning models on sensitive, high-value medical datasets.<n>Recent studies show adversaries can exfiltrate training data by embedding latent representations into model parameters.<n>We propose a simple yet effective mitigation strategy that perturbs model parameters at export time through fine-tuning with a decaying layer-wise learning rate.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-08-20T09:05:01Z) - Adversarial Machine Learning: Attacking and Safeguarding Image Datasets [0.0]
This paper examines the vulnerabilities of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to adversarial attacks and explores a method for their safeguarding.<n>CNNs were implemented on four of the most common image datasets and achieved high baseline accuracy.<n>It appears that while most level of robustness is achieved against the models after adversarial training, there are still a few losses in the performance of these models against adversarial perturbations.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-01-31T22:32:38Z) - FACTUAL: A Novel Framework for Contrastive Learning Based Robust SAR Image Classification [10.911464455072391]
FACTUAL is a Contrastive Learning framework for Adversarial Training and robust SAR classification.
Our model achieves 99.7% accuracy on clean samples, and 89.6% on perturbed samples, both outperforming previous state-of-the-art methods.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-04-04T06:20:22Z) - Learn from the Past: A Proxy Guided Adversarial Defense Framework with
Self Distillation Regularization [53.04697800214848]
Adversarial Training (AT) is pivotal in fortifying the robustness of deep learning models.
AT methods, relying on direct iterative updates for target model's defense, frequently encounter obstacles such as unstable training and catastrophic overfitting.
We present a general proxy guided defense framework, LAST' (bf Learn from the Pbf ast)
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-10-19T13:13:41Z) - Isolation and Induction: Training Robust Deep Neural Networks against
Model Stealing Attacks [51.51023951695014]
Existing model stealing defenses add deceptive perturbations to the victim's posterior probabilities to mislead the attackers.
This paper proposes Isolation and Induction (InI), a novel and effective training framework for model stealing defenses.
In contrast to adding perturbations over model predictions that harm the benign accuracy, we train models to produce uninformative outputs against stealing queries.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-08-02T05:54:01Z) - Avoid Adversarial Adaption in Federated Learning by Multi-Metric
Investigations [55.2480439325792]
Federated Learning (FL) facilitates decentralized machine learning model training, preserving data privacy, lowering communication costs, and boosting model performance through diversified data sources.
FL faces vulnerabilities such as poisoning attacks, undermining model integrity with both untargeted performance degradation and targeted backdoor attacks.
We define a new notion of strong adaptive adversaries, capable of adapting to multiple objectives simultaneously.
MESAS is the first defense robust against strong adaptive adversaries, effective in real-world data scenarios, with an average overhead of just 24.37 seconds.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-06-06T11:44:42Z) - RelaxLoss: Defending Membership Inference Attacks without Losing Utility [68.48117818874155]
We propose a novel training framework based on a relaxed loss with a more achievable learning target.
RelaxLoss is applicable to any classification model with added benefits of easy implementation and negligible overhead.
Our approach consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defense mechanisms in terms of resilience against MIAs.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-07-12T19:34:47Z) - How Robust are Randomized Smoothing based Defenses to Data Poisoning? [66.80663779176979]
We present a previously unrecognized threat to robust machine learning models that highlights the importance of training-data quality.
We propose a novel bilevel optimization-based data poisoning attack that degrades the robustness guarantees of certifiably robust classifiers.
Our attack is effective even when the victim trains the models from scratch using state-of-the-art robust training methods.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-12-02T15:30:21Z) - Stylized Adversarial Defense [105.88250594033053]
adversarial training creates perturbation patterns and includes them in the training set to robustify the model.
We propose to exploit additional information from the feature space to craft stronger adversaries.
Our adversarial training approach demonstrates strong robustness compared to state-of-the-art defenses.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-07-29T08:38:10Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.